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We examine transitions between excise tax and license fee regimes in the laboratory. The regimes
have matched equilibrium Marshallian surplus, but license fees generate more tax revenue. The
license fees are large “avoidable costs,” known to hamper competitive equilibrium convergence.
With moderately experienced subjects, the prolonged transition to the license fee equilibrium has
these features: (1) Prices below equilibrium levels, resulting in firm losses; (2) Marshallian surplus
above equilibrium levels; and (3) transitional windfalls for the tax authority. With highly
experienced subjects, license fees lead to the instability and lower seller profits and efficiency
observed in past avoidable cost markets.
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Introduction.
The comparative statics of tax regimes in competitive equilibrium are well understood. As
Stern (1992, pp. 287-8) says, “Economists have considerable experience in the theoretical analysis
and comparison of different policy regimes.” However, Stern goes on to suggest that “They have
rather less experience and success in analyzing the problems of transition from one regime to
another…The problems of transition pose important theoretical and immediate policy challenges
and no doubt will be lively topics of further research.” Where transitions are prolonged, and have
properties that are sufficiently distinct from the long-run equilibrium properties of the new regime,
transitional periods may be interesting in their own right, both  for optimal tax policy and  for
understanding the political economy of tax regime change.
In this paper, we describe an experimental change in tax regimes whose transitional
dynamics look potentially interesting in just these senses. The transition of particular interest is
from an existing excise tax regime to a “license fee” regime where the “fee” is levied per period of
activity, rather than per unit of output as with the excise tax. With moderately experienced subjects,
this transition is slow and overshoots the new license fee equilibrium, resulting in sustained losses
to firms, a large temporary windfall for the tax authority, and total market surplus that is
temporarily larger than predicted by the competitive equilibrium.
Under the license fee regime, each firm decides, in each market period, whether to pay a tax
allowing it to be “active” (i.e., sell output) during that period; but the size of the license fee itself is
independent of the number of units the firm sells in any period. Such license fees are not true lump-
sum taxes since they are avoided by inactivity; therefore they can cause distortions at the extensive2
margin. Nevertheless, a license fee regime can occasionally produce Pareto improvements over an
excise tax regime since it causes no distortion at the intensive margin.
From the viewpoint of each firm, however, substantial license fees can be viewed as large
“avoidable costs” (Telser 1978)—essentially, large marginal costs associated with the first unit of
output sold in some period. Various experimental work shows that large avoidable production costs
disrupt the competitive equilibrium tendencies of many decentralized trading institutions (Van
Boening and Wilcox 1996, 2003; Durham et al. 1996; Archibald et al. 2002). Under these
conditions, sellers frequently lose money and equilibrium convergence is slow and erratic; and once
equilibrium is achieved, it is not nearly so stable as it is when there are no large avoidable costs.
We conjectured that these empirical regularities might also hold when the avoidable costs in
question are a transfer like a license fee (rather than a real production cost) and in fact they do.
The temporary windfalls of tax revenue and total surplus we observe during these
transitions, however, are different from what has been seen in past experiments on avoidable cost
markets. In past experiments, efficiency has been unusually low, primarily because avoidable costs
have been real resource costs rather than transfers, but also because benchmark equilibria in past
work were first-best (so that all out-of-equilibrium allocations decreased total surplus) rather than
distorted (as occurs at an equilibrium subject to a non-lump-sum tax).
We observe a systematic tendency for the transitional price trajectory to overshoot its new
license fee equilibrium value as well. This is probably an informational phenomenon. Firms’ costs
and profits are heterogenous and private information in our experiment and, moreover, all firms can
profitably operate in the excise tax equilibrium. As a result, firms neither know ex ante whether
they are high or low cost producers, nor does experience in the excise tax regime reveal this
information. By contrast, the transition to the license fee regime involves a “shakeout period” in3
which a high cost firm must exit. Our interpretation is that at least for some firms, a transitional
period of negative profits (for at least the high cost firm) is necessary to produce the information
firms need to make decisions that are consistent with the new license fee equilibrium.
I. Regimes and Institution.
By an excise tax, we mean a per-unit-sold payment by a firm. By a license fee, we mean a
per-period-active payment by a firm: If the firm is “active” in a specified time period (that is, sells
any units), it must pay the license fee once during that period (for instance, truck registration fees).
Notice that from a firm’s ex ante viewpoint, license fees are “avoidable costs”—large variable costs
avoided by being inactive for a period (for instance, mothballing a truck). Of course, once a license
fee is paid, it becomes a sunk cost over the remainder of the licensed time period. But when a
period ends, all firms’ “licenses” expire, so that as new periods begin, each seller must again decide
whether to incur the license fee and sell output.
As mentioned earlier, large avoidable costs vastly slow convergence to CE allocations and
undermine the stability of attained CE allocations in past experiments. This has been replicated for
several institutions, but is perhaps most surprising in the case of the “double auction” or DA market
(Van Boening and Wilcox 1996). Thirty years of experiments show that DA markets almost always
converge very rapidly to CE prices and allocations (Plott 1989). In this sense it is the paradigmatic
competitive institution of the laboratory, and this is why we use it for our comparison of excise tax
and license fee regimes. Agents in a DA submit offers to buy or sell that are publicly displayed to
all other agents, and binding contracts occur when any agent accepts an outstanding offer made by
another agent. This public offer and contracting activity continues for a specified time period.4
Our comparison of “pure” versions of excise tax and license fee regimes is for maximum
design contrast (and hence statistical power) rather than realism. In practice, policy makers
frequently employ these regimes in concert. Moreover, we note that most (if not all) actual changes
in tax policy are “incremental.” That is, a wholesale switch between two dissimilar regimes, as in
this experiment, is probably a very rare event in the world outside of the laboratory (though these
kinds of changes are the occasional stuff of policy debates).
II. Theory and Design.
License fees can sometimes improve on excise taxes since they can transfer rents to a tax
authority, when rents are present. Marginal firms may exit because of either kind of tax; but the
marginal decisions of remaining firms are not distorted by license fees as they are by excise taxes.
As a result the license fee can, under certain circumstances, earn tax revenue equal to that earned
by any excise tax and increase total surplus. Alternatively, the tax authority may choose a license
fee which earns more revenue than an excise tax but leaves total surplus unchanged. We examine
the latter case for reasons described below.
II-A. Experimental background.
For contextual purposes, we briefly review our design and findings in Van Boening and
Wilcox (1996). Consider a market with four identical buyers who each value 4 units of a good at a
constant 250 per unit. Four sellers i = 1 to 4 each have a capacity constraint ci, large avoidable costs
ai and no marginal costs. Put differently, each seller has a “batch production” cost function Ci(0) =
0 and Ci(qi) = ai " qi £ ci. Table 1 displays ai, ci and average cost at capacity ai = ai/ci for each of5
the four sellers in this design. Given 16 units of demand at p
 < 250, some reflection reveals that the
CE for this market is Q
e = 16 units and p
e ˛ [180,210]. We find that double auctions facing this
market structure converge very slowly (if at all) to the CE; and efficiency, measured as the
percentage of CE Marshallian surplus, tends to be erratic and low. This is true even for highly
experienced subjects.
Why is efficiency unusually low? Part of the problem is that, in this structure, quantity
deviations from the CE result in sizeable losses of surplus. As a result, supply instabilities can have
large consequences. Inelastic demand in the neighborhood of the CE, and the pure avoidable cost
technology, are the culprits. Underproduction leaves high-value demand unfilled, usually at zero
marginal production cost, while overproduction has zero value to buyers and can only activate
unnecessary capacity at a very high avoidable cost. The potential for large surplus losses from CE
deviations, combined with the sluggish convergence and instability of these markets, has produced
unusually low efficiency in experiments where avoidable costs are real production costs.
II-B. Implications for license fees.
Supply instability appears to be a robust phenomenon in Van Boening and Wilcox’s (1996)
avoidable cost double auction markets. Although license fees are similar to an avoidable cost, the
license fee regime examined here differs from these previous avoidable cost markets in three
important ways, as follows: (1) Demand is more elastic (so that a given quantity reduction from
equilibrium output has smaller efficiency consequences); (2) The license fees here are transfers
rather than real resource costs; and (3) The CE of the markets in this study involve a downward
production distortion from the untaxed CE level (as happens with many taxes). The latter two
modifications set a stage where overproduction (relative to the distorted CE) can enhance6
efficiency. It follows that any destabilizing effects of an avoidable license fee may either increase
or decrease efficiency relative to the CE with the license fee, depending on the relative frequency
and severity of episodes of over- and underproduction (relative to the CE). For this reason, we
compare an excise tax regime CE and a license fee regime CE which are matched in total CE
surplus, but where the license fee should yield more CE tax revenue.
II-C. Broad features of the design.
Sellers' production costs and buyers' marginal valuations are identical under the two tax
regimes. The demand curve is elastic in the neighborhood of the CE, and firms have standard
upward-sloping marginal production cost schedules and no avoidable or fixed production costs.
Under the excise tax regime, sellers pay an amount t, in addition to any production costs, for each
unit they sell to buyers. Under the license fee regime, sellers pay a flat fee F, in addition to any
production costs, if and only if they sell any units to buyers during some trading period. Thus, t is a
per-unit-sold tax, whereas F is a per-period-active tax.
Our design equalizes the CE efficiency of these two tax regimes, but the two regimes should
distribute surplus differently in their respective after-tax equilibria. If the license fee destabilizes
quantity supplied, and if deviations are more common and/or severe either below or above the CE
quantity of the license fee regime, then the efficiency of the license fee regime may either fall short
of, or exceed, that of the excise tax regime. If either occurs, it is of interest to know who bears the
burden (and who benefits) from any such deviation from competitive efficiency predictions.
Finally, we will vary tax regimes within each market session. In our past study (Van Boening and
Wilcox 1996), we recommended this for avoidable cost structures because of their unusually high7
between-session variability. Under such circumstances, within-session treatment variation greatly
improves the power of statistical tests.
Aside from its statistical advantages, the within-session regime variation also allows us to
examine regime transition dynamics. Transition dynamics may exhibit characteristics that are
markedly different from the equilibrium characteristics of the final regime. Obviously this could be
of some importance, either economically or politically or both. There may be transition costs or
even transition windfalls during a transition; and those costs or windfalls may be borne in different
ways by different agents. We consider these results on transition dynamics to be among the most
interesting results from the experiment.
II-D. Details of the design.
All subjects first participated in training sessions involving ten trading periods—five under
each regime—with instruction in the mechanics of each regime and its record-keeping procedures
prior to each five-period block. Upon completion of a training session, subjects were recruited for
the data collection sessions, which we refer to here as our “test” sessions. The training sessions
used structural parameters (that is, costs, values, taxes and fees) that are different from those used
in the ten “test” sessions following the training sessions.
Tables 2-A and 2-B show buyer value and seller cost parameters used for our first six test
sessions. The tables show marginal costs and marginal values, in cents, for four sellers and four
buyers. These are standard ascending marginal production cost schedules and standard descending
marginal value schedules. The first six sessions consisted of six periods of an excise tax regime
with t1 = 55 cents and twelve periods of a license fee regime with F1 = 260 cents. Figure 1 shows
three different competitive equilibria for this structure. The demand curve D is generated by the8
marginal buyer values shown in Table 2-B, and the supply curve S is generated by the seller
marginal costs shown in Table 2-A. These two curves cross at a no-tax CE of p
e
1 = 90 cents and Q
e
1
= 18 units. The supply curve S
t is the supply curve S shifted upward by the excise tax t1 = 55 cents,
and crosses the demand curve at an excise tax CE of p
t
1 = 120 cents and q
t
1 = 12 units. In addition
to sellers' marginal costs, Table 2-A shows sellers' average costs with a license fee F1 = 260 cents.
With this fee, minimum average total cost is 95 cents for sellers 1, 2 and 3, and 105 cents for seller
4. These are minimum supply prices for these sellers under the license fee regime. At these prices
they become willing to supply their maximum output consistent with minimum average cost, and
units beyond this are supplied at the marginal cost of those units. In Figure 1,  the supply curve
labeled S
F aggregates these four competitive supply functions, and it crosses the demand curve at a
license fee CE of p
F
1 = 105 cents and Q
F
1 = 15 units.
The predicted competitive equilibria are thus p
t
1 = 120 and Q
t
1 = 12 under the t1 = 55
excise tax regime, and p
F
1 = 105 and Q
F
1 = 15 under the F1 = 260 license fee regime. It is also
important to remember that under the license fee regime, the no-tax equilibrium p
e
1 = 90 cents and
Q
e
1 = 18 units can become the short-run equilibrium during any market period where all sellers
have paid the license fee (because of its sunk and output-independent character). Table 2-C breaks
down total equilibrium surplus per period under the two tax regimes for the first six sessions. Total
equilibrium surplus is constant, but a regime transition should have quite large distributional
effects. License fees should transfer surplus from the sellers to the tax authority and buyers.
As mentioned above, subjects in the first six sessions have been given receive prior
experience with the DA trading institution, tax regimes and laboratory procedures from previous
training sessions. However, in training session markets, the competitive equilibrium was identical
under both tax regimes and the transition from one tax regime to the other is interrupted by a break9
for additional instructions. Therefore, though they are experienced with the mechanics of trading
and record keeping in the two regimes, subjects in the first six sessions (after the training sessions)
are encountering an uninterrupted equilibrium-changing regime transition for the first time (and
may not even think of the training session change as a “transition” because of the break for
instruction). We also want to see how these subjects will handle an equilibrium-changing regime
transition after they have already experienced one. So we recruit subjects from the first six sessions
for four “super-experienced” sessions.
To digress briefly, we have mixed feelings about subject experience levels in this particular
experiment. On the one hand, experimentalists tend to give more credit and weight to results as
subject experience accumulates and, other things equal, we agree with this. On the other hand, we
are unsure whether subjects who are “experienced with large regime transitions” are of much
practical relevance to the natural world. Large changes in tax regimes are the stuff of some policy
discussions (proposals for large revisions of the income tax code are a familiar example), but
almost all changes actually enacted in policy are small and incremental. If in fact large regime
changes are very infrequent events, it may be less interesting to know how people deal with large
regime changes “similar to other large regime changes they have already experienced.” With this
digression in mind, then, we return to the design of the super-experienced sessions.
The final four super-experienced sessions each consist of seven periods of the excise tax
regime and fourteen periods of the license fee regime. Tables 3-A and 3-B show the underlying
structural parameters for these four sessions. While this structure is somewhat different from that
used for the first six sessions, the CE comparative statics across tax regimes are essentially similar.
Table 3-C shows the breakdown of total equilibrium surplus with an excise tax  t2 = 66 and a
license fee F2 = 252. As before, the two regimes generate equal CE surplus and, relative to the10
excise tax regime, the license fee regime should transfer seller surplus to the tax authority and
buyers. The predicted competitive equilibria for the design are p
t
2 = 162 and Q
t
2 =9 under the
excise tax regime with t2 = 66, and p
F
2 = 144 and Q
F
2 = 12 under the license fee regime with F2 =
252. The no-tax equilibrium (or short-run license fee equilibrium when all sellers sink their license
fee) is p
e
2 ˛ [126,132] and Q
e
2 = 15.
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the ten sessions. Note that half of the sessions
begin with license fees and then switch to excise taxes, while the other half begin with excise taxes
and switch to license fees.
1 Treatment (that is, regime) order variation controls for order effects
when using within-session treatment variations, and also reveals the nature of regime transitions.
However, our unequal division of trading periods between the two treatments is less standard
(within each session, license fee regimes last twice as long as excise tax regimes). We do this for
two reasons. First, we expect license fees to increase the variance of our dependent measures, just
as avoidable costs do in Van Boening and Wilcox (1996), so it makes statistical sense to sample
that treatment relatively heavily. Second, we allow for the expected slow convergence of avoidable
cost double auctions by giving the license fee regime more periods to achieve convergence.
III. Experimental Results.
III-A. Distribution differences between regimes.
Table 5 details how actual surplus per period differed in the license fee regime and the
excise tax regime in each experimental session. From left to right, the four columns show the actual
average per-period differences of (1) total surplus, (2) buyer surplus, (3) seller surplus and (4) tax
                                                
1 The session names in Table 4 are for expository convenience. Chronologically, these sessions were conducted in a
randomized order.11
revenue between license fee and excise tax trading periods. The top panel shows data from the first
six sessions, and the bottom panel shows data from the final four sessions. The rows labeled
“Prediction” are the CE predictions for these differences (copied from Tables 2-C and 3-C), while
the rows labeled by session name show the actual per-period difference in each respective session.
For example, actual total surplus per period in session Tax1 was 19 cents greater under the license
fee regime than the excise tax regime, contrary to the CE predicted difference of zero.
The lower part of the top panel shows p-values for two nonparametric “randomization tests”
(Bradley 1968, Pratt and Gibbons 1981) based on data from the first six sessions. Each test treats
each column of differences as six observations (one observation per session). The Randomization
Test is more powerful than rank-sum tests, and nearly as good as the most powerful parametric test,
against one-sided Normally distributed alternatives, and is valid under very general assumptions.
Monte Carlo analyses conducted by Moir (1998) suggest that this test compares very favorably to
other popular tests in terms of power and robustness.
The tests labeled “Test 1” in Table 5 have null hypotheses that differences in total surplus,
buyer and seller surplus, and tax revenue, are zero across the two regimes, versus the one-tailed
alternatives that they are in the direction of the CE prediction. The p-values for Test 1 show that
our data strongly supports these directional predictions. But when we look at the sizes of these
effects, rather than their directions, a different picture emerges. The tests labeled “Test 2” are those
associated with two-tailed randomization tests against the null hypotheses that the sizes of the
differences are in accord with CE predictions. The first p-value shows that the equality of total
surplus across the regimes is rejected, and all of the observed differences show that total surplus is
greater under the license fee regime. For Test 2, buyer and seller surplus differences have marginal
p-values (p = .06 and p = .09, respectively), but in each case five of the six observed differences are12
smaller in absolute value than CE comparative statics predict. Although the license fee regime does
transfer surplus to buyers and take surplus from sellers, those distributional effects are most
definitely muted. The story is different for tax revenue, however. In every one of the first six
sessions, the difference between the tax revenue generated by license fees and excise taxes is
greater than the CE prediction, and the null hypothesis is easily rejected (p = .03). In other words,
the tax authority gets an unexpected windfall under the license fee regime. In the next section we
argue that this is largely the product of prolonged transition dynamics.
The final four sessions cannot significantly support the findings from the first six sessions.
Put simply, the lowest possible two-tailed p-value of the randomization test, given four within-
session treatment variations, is 0.125. Therefore, p-values are omitted for these super-experienced
sessions. Nevertheless, while buyer surplus differences between the regimes are usually smaller
than predicted—in keeping with the results of the first six sessions—it seems that other significant
deviations from competitive predictions have disappeared. However, patterns of transitional
dynamics recur in all ten of the sessions, and we now turn to this matter.
III-B. Dynamics of regime transitions.
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the first six sessions. The left (right) panels show
sessions that began with the license fee (excise tax) regime. The top graph in each panel shows
every contract price in every trading period. The dashed horizontal lines across these graphs are the
various CE prices. The lower line represents the no-tax CE price of 90 cents, which is constant
across all periods. The upper line represents the CE price of 120 cents during excise tax periods, or
the CE price of 105 cents during license fee periods.13
Period trading volumes are graphed just below each price graph. Again, the dashed lines
across these volume graphs denote various competitive volume levels. The upper line represents the
upper bound on no-tax CE volume, which is 19 units in all periods; and the lower line represents
the CE volume of 12 units during excise tax periods, or the CE volume of 15 units during license
fee periods. And finally, sellers' total surplus or profits in each period are graphed below each
volume graph. The solid line across these profit graphs represents zero seller surplus; and the
dashed line represents the CE sellers' surplus of 480 cents during excise tax periods, or the CE
sellers' surplus of 150 cents during license fee periods.
Figure 2 illustrates the diverse dynamics of the sessions. The upper left panel, for instance,
shows session Tax1. In many respects, the price data from Tax1 are fairly ordinary. Most trading
prices under the beginning license fee regime are at or near the competitive price, and price
variance is fairly low. As in Van Boening and Wilcox (1996), there is great between-session
variability among avoidable cost DA sessions. Some are orderly while others are quite erratic, and
license fee periods of Tax1 appear to be the orderly kind. By contrast, the license fee periods of
session Tax2 show the wild price dynamics seen in many avoidable cost double auctions.
But even in the license fee portion of the relatively quiet session Tax1, the stylized
avoidable cost facts observed in Van Boening and Wilcox (1996) are in evidence. Seller surplus
rarely reaches its CE value of 150 cents under the license fee regime. This is true despite CE
surplus asymmetries favoring the buyers under the license fee regime. As Smith and Williams
(1982) show, an ordinary DA market with only marginal production costs would (in the presence of
this kind of CE surplus asymmetry) normally give sellers super-competitive surplus prior to CE
convergence; that is, prices with such equilibrium surplus asymmetries would normally converge to
the CE “from above.” Here, almost all price variability in license fee periods is downside14
variability that benefits the buyers. In Tax2 these effects are especially severe. There, total seller
profits are actually negative in seven of twelve license fee periods. Frequent seller losses are also
observed in Van Boening and Wilcox (1996). Volume exceeds the CE value of 15 units as often as
not, and is at or near the first-best upper bound of 19 units in five license fee periods of Tax1. There
is temporary overproduction relative to the CE under the license fee regime that temporarily
enhances efficiency; and this occurs to a greater or lesser extent in all six of the first sessions.
Tax1 also illustrates the sluggish price adjustment that occurs when a license fee regime is
replaced by an excise tax regime. The new excise tax CE is only fifteen cents above the license fee
CE. Nevertheless, a full eight trading periods after the regime change in Tax1, excise tax regime
prices have not reached their CE level. This sluggish adjustment recurs in all three sessions where
the excise tax regime follows the license fee regime and in part accounts for the smaller than
predicted difference between buyer surplus under license fees and excise taxes shown in Table 5.
Strong surplus asymmetries favoring the sellers under the excise tax regime may also play a role
here. Again, from Smith and Williams (1982) we know that when equilibrium surplus favors sellers
in a marginal cost double auction, prices will usually converge to the CE from below—to the
benefit of the buyers. Yet sluggish adjustment and surplus asymmetries are not the whole story.
Table 5 showed that the actual difference between license fee and excise tax buyer surplus is
smaller than predicted regardless of regime order. And the right hand panels in Figure 2 show that
prices do in fact converge to the excise tax CE from below even in those sessions where the excise
tax regime comes first.
Transitions from excise taxes to license fees are much rougher, as illustrated in the right
panels of Figure 2. The sequences of maximum trading prices observed within each period under
the license fee regime (following an excise tax regime) show something very like sluggish price15
adjustment from the relatively high excise tax CE prices. But also notice that, both within and
across periods of the license fee regime, prices tend to overshoot the CE and tumble into the
neighborhood of the no-tax CE. The session Tax6 was quite typical. All four sellers try to sell
output in periods 8 through 14, and volume reaches no-tax CE levels in several periods (recall that,
when all sellers are active, this is the short-run CE). Prices and profits fall until, in periods 13 and
14, the total profits of sellers are negative. Two sellers exit in period 15 and prices and profits
rebound; finally, in period 16, prices and profits begin a fairly orderly ascent toward the license fee
CE. Less pronounced instances of this overshooting and damped oscillation of prices and profits
are also observed in the license fee periods of sessions Tax4 and Tax5.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of tax revenues in all of the sessions. The top panel shows the
sequence of deviations of tax revenue from its predicted CE value in each trading session of the
first six sessions. It is clear that deviations under the sales tax regime are small and as likely to be
negative as positive. Neither of these facts hold under the license fee regime. Because tax revenue
comes as large license fees, all deviations are large ones. And thirty-nine percent of the seventy-
five license fee periods generate positive deviations (periods when all four sellers are active), while
a mere three percent of these periods generate negative deviations (periods when just two sellers
are active).
Table 5 showed that many surplus effects observed in the first six sessions were absent from
the final four super-experienced sessions. But Figure 4 shows that some of the dynamics of the first
six sessions are in evidence in the final four sessions. The left panels show the two sessions that
begin with the license fee treatment. Once again, prices tend to converge to the CE from below, in
spite of the fact that surplus asymmetries favor the buyers. However, the convergence is very
orderly and swift for an avoidable cost double auction; and volume and seller profits also rapidly16
converge to their CE values. And when the regime is changed to an excise tax regime, price
adjustment is less sluggish than in previous sessions. In both of these sessions, prices and profits
climb relatively quickly to their CE levels and volume quickly falls to its CE level.
The orderliness of sessions Tax7 and Tax8 contrasts sharply with the sessions Tax9 and
Tax10 that begin with the excise tax regime. In both of these sessions, prices under the excise tax
regime never reach CE values. In one session prices are consistently too high; in the other they are
consistently too low. As a result, volume only reaches its excise tax CE value in a single period of
each of these sessions. But when the license fee regime replaces the excise tax regime, trading
prices overshoot the license fee CE and are frequently in the neighborhood of the no-tax CE—as
was true for less experienced subjects in the sessions Tax4, Tax5 and Tax6. After this overshooting,
prices gradually converge from below toward their license fee CE level. This overshooting and
gradual convergence takes place with little within-period dispersion in the session Tax10. But
session Tax9 produces trading price dynamics reminiscent of the more severe “roller coaster”
markets observed in Van Boening and Wilcox (1996). Under the excise tax regime, high within-
period price dispersion begins to shrink. But when the license fee regime is put in place in period 9,
price dispersion repeatedly explodes and shrinks in rapid succession as periods pass.
The super-experienced sellers in the session Tax9 usually earned zero or negative total
profits during the first five periods of the license fee regime. This experience convinced two sellers
to exit the market during those periods and remain inactive until the very last period of the session.
As a result, trading prices gradually climbed far above the license fee CE. These sellers had
experienced severe within-period price collapses and associated negative profits during the first
three periods of the license fee regime. They had to be coaxed back into activity by a very long17
series of favorable prices; and that did not occur until ten periods after the first three brutal (for
sellers) trading periods.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the sequence of deviations of tax revenue from its
predicted CE value in each of the final four sessions. It is again clear that, as with the first six
sessions, deviations under the excise tax regime are all small, though now perhaps a little more
likely to be negative than positive. And while deviations under the license fee are again much
larger for obvious reasons, there seems to have been a fairly clear reversal of their typical direction.
Just seven percent of the fifty-six license fee periods generated positive deviations (periods when
all four sellers are active,) while a greater twenty percent of these periods generated negative
deviations (periods when just one or two sellers are active).
IV. Discussion and Conclusions.
There is one finding in this experiment which generalizes across all experience levels and
treatment orders. In all of the license fee treatment periods of the sessions, convergence to
equilibrium seems to require a series of periods during which prices are below their competitive
equilibrium levels. This is true even though the rent asymmetries of our license fee regimes favor
the buyers. Smith and Williams (1982) show that, for pure marginal cost double auctions, prices
tend to converge from a direction which transfers some CE surplus away from the side of the
market which receives the lion's share of equilibrium surplus. This never occurs in any of our
license fee regime sequences, even though CE buyer surplus is more than twice CE seller surplus in
those periods.18
We think there is a simple and compelling informational explanation for this overshooting.
In both designs, three sellers are low cost sellers who should be active producers in the license fee
CE, while one is an extramarginal high cost producer. While our instructions tell each seller not to
assume that other sellers have the same costs as she does, she is not told what cost differences may
be expected, much less whether she is a relatively high cost producer. Moreover, seller costs and
profits are private information throughout sessions. Under these informational conditions, negative
profits are virtually the only information a seller gets that reveal that she might be a relatively high
cost seller. Since the CE price is the minimum average cost of the high cost seller in the license fee
designs, it almost necessarily follows that a period of subequilibrium contract prices must precede
convergence to the CE price under the license fee regime. That is, overshooting of the license fee
CE in the transition from an excise tax regime may be a necessary part of these transition dynamics
when costs are private information.
2 This is especially true since all four sellers can be profitably
active under the excise tax regime. As a result, previous experience with the excise tax regime does
not reveal to sellers which amongst them is the high cost seller.
Sellers do learn some things in the first six sessions; but what they learn causes the license
fee regime to operate less efficiently and generate less tax revenue. Sellers seem to learn that
someone among their number may not be able to produce profitably under the license fee regime.
Armed with this knowledge, they seem much more willing to exit quickly when they experience
negative profits. In three of the final four sessions this leads to a relatively orderly convergence to
the license fee CE and, as a result, there are few efficiency-enhancing periods of overproduction in
these super-experienced sessions.
                                                
2 Theoretically, complete information on costs and values—or even well-specified incomplete information—might
considerably speed convergence to equilibrium. Paradoxically, giving complete information to subjects in double
auction markets frequently has little effect on, or actually slows, convergence to an equilibrium (Smith 1991, pp. 100-
105).19
As mentioned earlier, one can wonder what it means to be experienced with large regime
transitions such as the ones we study here. Most tax policy changes are incremental, and most
decision makers may only encounter large changes in tax policy once or twice in a lifetime.
Therefore, we cannot say whether more weight should be put  on our  results with moderately
experienced or super-experienced subjects. Our own judgment is that where costs and profits are
mostly private information (as they usually are), and where experience with large regime changes is
rare or wholly absent (as it usually would be), we would put more weight on our results for the
moderately experienced subjects. In such situations, it seems that a tax authority can expect a
transitional tax revenue windfall with no efficiency losses (indeed, temporary supercompetitive
surplus may be realized). On the other hand, the transition to a license fee equilibrium is brutal for
sellers, so they may have strong reasons to fear and fight such taxes—reasons even stronger in
regime transitions than comparative statics reasoning alone suggests.
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TABLE 1
Avoidable Costs, Capacities and Average Cost at Capacity of the Sellers
in one of Van Boening and Wilcox’s (1996) Avoidable Cost Market Structures
Sellers (i) Avoidable Costs (ai) Capacity (ci) Average Cost at Capacity (ai = ai/ci)
1 960 8 120
2 750 5 150
3 540 3 180
4 420 2 21023
TABLE 2-A
Seller Costs in cents, with an F = 260 cents License Fee (First Six Test Sessions)
Seller 1 Seller 2 Seller 3 Seller 4 Output of
Seller i (qi) MC1 ATC1 MC2 ATC2 MC3 ATC3 MC4 ATC4
1 10 270 10 270 10 270 30 290
2 20 145 15 143 10 140 45 168
3 25 105 30 105 35 105 60 132
4 75 98 70 96 65 95 65 115
5 85 95 90 95 95 95 65 105
6 125 100 115 98 105 97 105 105
7 140 106 150 106 160 106 170 114
Notes: MC is marginal production cost. Total marginal production and tax costs in the Excise Tax
treatment equal the marginal costs given above plus t = 55. ATC is the average total cost of each
seller under the F = 260 license fee treatment. In the excise tax treatment, average total costs are not
relevant to competitive supply (since the marginal production cost schedules are monotonically
increasing for all four firms, so that average total cost is always less than marginal cost).
TABLE 2-B
Buyer Values in cents (First Six Test Sessions)
Units Purchased by Buyer i Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4
1 145 140 137 136
2 140 137 133 132
3 125 130 133 132
4 105 110 115 120
5 100 95 90 85
6 65 70 75 80
7 60 55 45 40
TABLE 2-C
CE Total Surplus and its Predicted Division in cents, by Tax Regime (First Six Test Sessions)
Regime Total Surplus Buyer Surplus Seller Surplus Tax Revenue
License Fee 1320 390 150 780
Excise Tax 1320 180 480 660
Difference 0 210 -330 12024
TABLE 3-A
Seller Costs in cents, with an F = 252 cents License Fee (Final Four Test Sessions)
Seller 1 Seller 2 Seller 3 Seller 4 Output of
Seller i (qi) MC1 ATC1 MC2 ATC2 MC3 ATC3 MC4 ATC4
1 4 256 8 260 12 264 48 300
2 44 150 40 150 48 156 72 186
3 112 138 104 135 84 132 96 156
4 116 132 124 132 132 132 108 144
5 144 135 156 137 168 140 144 144
6 180 142 192 146 204 150 216 156
7 228 155 240 160 252 165 264 172
Notes: MC is marginal production cost. Total marginal production and tax costs in the excise tax
treatment equal the marginal costs given above plus t = 66. ATC is the average total cost of each
seller under the F = 252 license fee treatment. In the excise tax treatment, average total costs are not
relevant to competitive supply (since the marginal production cost schedules are monotonically
increasing for all four firms).
TABLE 3-B
Buyer Values in cents (Final Four Test Sessions)
Units Purchased by Buyer i Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4
1 184 182 180 180
2 184 182 180 174
3 150 156 162 168
4 126 132 138 144
5 102 108 114 120
6 72 84 90 96
7 48 54 60 66
TABLE 3-C
CE Total Surplus and its Predicted Division in cents, by Tax Regime (Final Four Test Sessions)
Regime Total Surplus Buyer Surplus Seller Surplus Tax Revenue
License Fee 1254 354 144 756
Excise Tax 1254 156 504 594
Difference 0 198 -360 16225
TABLE 4
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participation in one of the
sessions Tax1—Tax6
Notes: F = # denotes a license fee regime with the license fee equal to #, and t = # denotes an
excise tax regime with the excise tax equal to #. Some of the sessions Tax1-Tax6 actually lasted
one or two more periods than 18 total periods, and these extra period results are shown in Figure 2.
However, our statistical results, reported in Table 5, do not include the results of any periods
beyond period 18 in those sessions. In particular, the first two sessions we conducted lasted twenty
periods, the second two nineteen period, and the final two 18 periods.  In this manner, we control
for any expectations about the final period and avoid associated endgame effects. In the
experienced sessions Tax7-Tax10, we dispensed with this precaution; thus the statistical results of
Table 5 are based on all 21 periods of data from those four sessions.26
TABLE 5
Difference between average per-period surplus in the License Fee and Excise Tax regimes
Difference in per-period surplus













CE Prediction 0 210 -330 120
Tax1 License, Excise 19 79 -233 173
Tax2 License, Excise 98 193 -341 246
Tax3 License, Excise 119 98 -174 195
Tax4 Excise, License 6 115 -316 207
Tax5 Excise, License 70 221 -323 172
Tax6 Excise, License 215 138 -233 310
Randomization Tests (p-value)
Test 1 H0: Diff = 0, HA: Diff > 0 ￿ p = 0.02 ￿ p = 0.02
H0: Diff = 0, HA: Diff < 0 ￿ ￿ p = 0.02 ￿
Test 2 H0: Diff = CE prediction p = 0.03 p = 0.06 p = 0.09 p = 0.03
HA: Diff ? CE prediction all 6 > CE 5 of 6 < CE 5 of 6 > CE all 6 > CE
Final Four Sessions
CE Prediction 0 198 -360 162
Tax7 License, Excise -112 114 -361 135
Tax8 License, Excise 0 176 -337 161
Tax9 Excise, License -144 113 -341 84
Tax10 Excise, License 132 294 -417 255
Notes: All data are from the period listed in the first two columns of Table 4. The p-values are
calculated using the “randomization test” (Bradley 1968; Gibbons 1981). See the text for a
discussion of this test.